



Dear Shareholder,

Most of the value in investing comes from buying well and waiting.

Yet all great ideas, such as that, come with chinks in their armour.

The clear potential issues with a "buy and hold" strategy stem from mistakes due to lack of selling, which can take two forms:

1. Failing to sell a stock when the business weakens structurally / permanently

2. Failing to replace a "good" stock with a "great" one

We believe our "shelf" system, whereby we actively consider a wide range of stocks for investment for many years, goes some way to help the behavioural issues which stem from point 2 above. As we've noted in many previous letters, we believe all value is *relative* and go to pains to force ourselves to consider improvements within the portfolio even when the portfolio companies themselves are doing everything right.

An example would be our sale of Novo Nordisk in 2022, a business which we highly admire and would happily invest in in the future but felt our investors capital was better recycled at that valuation into another shelf stock: McKesson.

In this letter we explore some of our behaviour regarding point 1 above.

This is where the importance of thinking from first principles can help us focus on the facts as we determine them. Negative narratives and news flow feed on share price falls, resulting in vicious sentiment cycles. Not being guided by market enthusiasm or pessimism, but by our longer-term reflections on the quality of the business and its potential in the future, is where we think our process can add value at times such as these.

It's in this context we discuss three stocks which suffered c.50% share price falls where we felt the position warranted continued ownership. One which worked, one which is tentatively working, and one which is currently on its knees.

First, in brief, AutoZone.

This is a business which has suffered many episodes of negative sentiment.

This was on the inside cover of their 1991 annual report:





The Future of the DIY Market

Is the DIY market likely to disappear as technological advances make cars too complex for even the most mechanically proficient DIYers?

As Scientific American put it: "The remarkable development in the automobile industry, and the swift advances in automobile construction within recent years, have produced unexpected and unforeseen conditions, and one of the most striking phases in the situation is the lack of men trained to manage and care for the high-powered cars."

U.S. News & World Report, under the subtitle "No more do-it-yourself", proclaimed: "Current models...defy even the most dedicated do-it-yourself mechanics. Professional service has become a necessity."

Sounds like AutoZone ought to be worried...but for one thing: Scientific American's article was published in 1908, and since U.S. News & World Report declared the DIY market dead in 1968, the Commerce Department estimates it has grown by more than seven-fold. Our point is that people have been predicting the demise of the DIY market for so long now that we are reminded of the statement that Mark Twain once made: "Reports of my death are greatly exaggerated."

Source: AutoZone 1991 Annual Report

In 2017 the business was suffering from a pair of enormous negative narratives: that EVs would conquer the passenger car fleet and that Amazon would distribute auto parts. The stock peaked in late 2015, fell -40%, and didn't recover its high for three years.

Below is an extract from our 2017 annual report describing how we approached the situation:

"Since I first invested in 2009 in AutoZone the sector has been an incredibly attractive investment. The company has delivered a 100% growth in net income, using cash flow to buy back 50% of its shares outstanding resulting in a 400% increase in EPS. Last year the stock price fell dramatically as we saw the businesses enter **two bear traps**: namely disruption from Amazon and from increasing penetration of electric and autonomous cars. Given how worried the market has become, inverting the bearish analysis in both cases reveals a strong risk reward in favour of the long-term shareholder. It's true that growth rates in mature industries fade, however, the market consistently overestimates the speed of that decline, in particular in industries with strong fundamental dynamics. Buying AutoZone today an investor pays 15x earnings, a multiple implying little future growth in earnings. For context over the past ten years, including the recession, earnings have consistently grown at 15% per year, and we believe they will continue to grow at least c.5-10% per year in the near future.


The short-term threat from autonomous driving is misguided. There are 253m cars in the US, with an average age of 11.4 years, and an average new cars sales rate of 16.8m. If we assume conservatively that autonomous cars arrive on main street in 2020 (we think it will be closer to 2030), and 1/3 of all cars are autonomous, then 5 years from now, the stock of cars in the US will be c.270m of which 11m will be autonomous. Critically in that period the sector will have still been able to grow earnings and cash flow per share, through consolidation, increased cost leverage, buybacks and a higher average vehicle age.





Regarding the threat from Amazon, 65% of industry sales are to small garages, often fulfilled on a 30-minute delivery time, from a locally managed assortment of inventory. Mechanics care little about cost, and far more about job turnover in their bays, and are thus happy to pay for this availability and quick delivery. Amazon can only compete on a next day basis in the US, so we see little current threat to this side of the business. The remaining 35% of sales is DIY, 86% of which is non-discretionary repair or maintenance spend. Of Amazon's 20 top selling "automotive" products, only one is non-discretionary, due to the fact that items are bulky, fragile, and often require a level of service at the point of sale. As a result, only 10% of the 35% DIY segment is currently online (of which around half is Amazon) so even if Amazon were to double their sales in automotive, and all of those sales were to take share from the listed APRs (unlikely given most share is being taken from non-discretionary purchases at garages, mass merchants etc) then this would imply just a 1.7% sales drag to the industry. Despite the clear bear cases, and perhaps some continued short-term volatility, we believe the best is yet to come for this industry from a cash flow focussed shareholder's perspective."

The 2015 to 2018 period now looks like a simple period to have owned the business but, at the time, at least half of the investor questions we received were focused on this underperforming sector and why we owned it through such *evident* radical disruption.



Source: Bloomberg

Next, we turn to our holding in **Dollar Tree**.

We added meaningfully to the position during the quarter.

Latitude Global Fund Q225 COMMENTARY | DATA AS AT 30TH JUNE 2025



Regular readers will know that we equally weight our portfolio and seldom trim or add to our holdings, so the context and reasons behind this decision warrant an explanation.

Dollar Tree is a US based discount retailer with 9,000 stores nationwide. Dollar Tree's product mix splits 50/50 between consumables (pantry staples, drinks, sweets, cleaning products, personal care items) and discretionary items (craft supplies, party items, kitchen crockery, glassware, light DIY). Until 2019, everything in store could be purchased for \$1, Dollar Tree then expanded the price architecture to include items in the \$3-7 range (currently available in 5,000 of the 9,000 stores). The consumer retail proposition is everyday items at very low prices and Dollar Tree's appeal spans low-income households to those with six figure incomes.




In share price terms, Dollar Tree had a difficult 2024, experiencing a -47% drawdown¹ which we reviewed in our <u>annual report</u>. The drawdown comprised of a -40% reduction in valuation multiple and the remainder was attributed to a slight reduction in earnings expectations.

¹ Bloomberg







Source: Bloomberg, LIM

There is a saying in markets that "price drives narrative" and consequently the reflexivity and momentum within financial markets means prices can trend (both positively and negatively) until something fundamentally changes. Bad news likes company, and over the remainder of 2024 investors became increasingly concerned by the muted same store comparable sales, the overhang of the strategic review, whether Walmart and Temu were taking share from discount stores, why the softer consumer backdrop wasn't driving higher footfall from bargain seeking consumers, competitor profit warnings (notably Five Below which also skews towards discretionary items) and finally by Rick Dreiling's surprise departure (ostensibly for health reasons) in November 2024. The combination of all these factors was enough to see Dollar Tree's multiple compress to 10x earnings.

In our annual report we identified that our principal concern with Dollar Tree was the acquisition of Family Dollar in 2015 – which approximately doubled the size of the business. Family Dollar has a store format skewed more towards low-income consumers and consumables, rather than discretional general merchandise (approx. 80/20).

Last year, Dollar Tree announced the 'strategic review' of Family Dollar, which we supported. At that point we ran several scenarios on what we felt could be done with the business and the potential impact on the financial and competitive positioning. At the same time, we remained content with Dollar Tree's standalone performance: even with consumers under significant pressure, 2024 same store sales averaged c. 2%, never turning negative.





As we remarked in the annual report, our principal concern was with the outcome of the Family Dollar strategic review. We felt that Dollar Tree was inexpensive (certainly based on the strength of Dollar Tree's same store sales) and that the reason for the lack of uptick in footfall was the lack of unemployment. We noted:

"A small silver lining is our practice of never averaging down into positions without concrete evidence of operational improvement in the numbers, which means that today Dollar Tree represents a 2% holding."

To add to our position, we were looking for a positive resolution to the Family Dollar strategic review and confidence that trading was improving. At the end of March 2025, Dollar Tree announced the sale of Family Dollar for \$1bn, at the upper end of our scenario analysis from last year. In the preceding quarters we had also witnessed the improving same store sales trends between consumables and discretionary items which had improved for three consecutive quarters. As such we incorporated 'the facts' and were able to double our position in Dollar Tree on the day of the sale announcement at an average price of \$70.

The sale achieved two things:

- 1. All of Dollar Tree's profit and cash generation would be available for reinvestment in Dollar Tree's growth at high returns on capital
- 2. The \$1bn proceeds from Family Dollar would materially delever the balance sheet which had historically been solely carried by the Dollar Tree banner.

The combination of these factors meant that at \$70, Dollar Tree traded on c. 12x earnings, with a high single-digit prospective free cash flow yield and an under levered balance sheet positioned to repurchase over \$1bn of stock (>7% of shares outstanding) *per annum*.

We do not factor multiple expansion into our investment decisions. With Dollar Tree primed to return capital to shareholders we see mid-teens intrinsic value growth without a re-rating and, without the distraction of Family Dollar, a greater probability of execution success.

That said, a couple of years post-completion, we see potential for >\$9 of earnings which on its historic multiple of 22x means the shares could approximately treble to \$200.

We believe waiting for tangible evidence of improvement before adding to underperforming positions is the optimal, value maximising approach for investors. It is not guaranteed that you will always get the opportunity to, as positive clearing events often result in a material repricing of the equity; however, this instance illustrates that this is not always so, great opportunities do present themselves to patient and prepared investors.

Finally, Diageo.

Diageo has also fallen around 50% and currently sits at the lowest level in ten years.

Latitude Global Fund Q225 COMMENTARY | DATA AS AT 30TH JUNE 2025



During the inflationary period which followed the lockdowns in 2020, alcoholic beverage prices rose. Volumes initially spiked although they fell below trend in 2023 and 2024. The cumulative effect of this can be seen in the below data², which shows "litres of pure alcohol" (LPA) growth, a metric which normalises for sales across beer, wine and spirits.

Spirits LPA in the US				
Vol Growth	%			
2007	2.2			
2008	1.7			
2009	1.4			
2010	2.0			
2011	2.9			
2012	3.0			
2013	1.9			
2014	2.3			
2015	2.3			
2016	2.4			
2017	1.1			
2018	1.9	Avg. 07-19		
2019	3.1	2.2		
2020	6.2			
2021	5.4			
2022	0.8			
2023	-2.8	Avg. 20-24	Below T	rend 1y / 5y
2024	-2.1	1.5	-0.7	-3.3

Source: Bernstein, LIM

Volume growth which averaged 2.2% per year pre-pandemic has averaged 1.5% per year since, with a cumulative "lag to trend" of 3.3% of growth over five years. It's worth noting revenues rose 22% over the same period when including price increases across the products.

This weaker trend in volume has been attributed by the market to two primary drivers:

- 1. The young / Gen Z's drinking habits
- 2. Those on weight loss drugs are drinking less alcohol

The former is quite easy to refute as a cause for this fall in volumes. While they may, or may not, drink less than previous generations, across all the major spirits companies which we can find data or estimates for (including

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² Bernstein data and LIM calculations





Diageo, Remy, Pernot, Campari and others), Gen Z (those born after 1996) only account for around 2-3% of sales.

This could be a longer-term issue should they decide to drink less as they mature, but this cannot account for the drop in volumes today. At Diageo specifically we note 75% of sales are generated by consumers born before 1981. Consumers take longer to mature than the scotch they drink.

Moreover, there is strong evidence that younger consumers are drawn to spirits earlier through cocktails, and there is also recent evidence that their drinking habits are, in fact, coming back in line with previous generations already.

So, what could it be?

A far more benign potential answer strikes us as the most probable. The average working capital cycle for spirits in the retail and wholesale channels is around 100 days. A 3.3% cumulative fall in volumes (from trend as shown above), could be a sign of lower inventory as opposed to lower-end demand. If this were the case, this would imply a 12% reduction in volume held in inventory through the supply chain. Given the rapid increase in prices over the past five years, might those in the supply chain simply have targeted their working capital efficiency?

This is supported by data shown by Remy in their latest investor update which discusses the shape of the inventory cycle³.

Time will tell but the potential for Diageo from here, in our opinion, warrants holding the shares with the potential to add to a highly undervalued business if the operating performance improves.

Spirits are a long-lived category, where the value of their assets actually rise in value the longer they are held in barrel inventory.

Diageo has around 6% market share⁴ in the US, their most important market. It seems highly plausible to us that this figure will rise over time, with this current low ebb creating opportunities for bargain acquisitions of challenger brands as venture capital financing dries up.

The new CFO has addressed some of the elevated costs which crept in during the boom years of 2021 and 2022, which should be straightforward to fix.

We leave you with another old newspaper cutting from 1984⁵ proclaiming the change in drinking habits and the demise of alcoholic beverage companies.


³ Remy Cointreau FY24-25 Presentation, slide 7

⁴ Diageo and Nielsen data

⁵ The Index Journal



America is drinking less and liquor industry is changing





Source: The Index Journal